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ABSTRACT
As agricultural products move from being economic commodities to quality-differentiated
goods, price dispersion within specific markets increases and implicit subsidies from high
quality producers to low quality producers are removed.   This paper examines how these
distributional effects can influence patterns of support and opposition to changes in
marketing arrangements.  The simple model developed is calibrated using data from the
U.S. slaughter cattle market.  Estimates of the economic impact on producers of measuring
quality more accurately are found to be similar in size to previous estimates of market power
price suppression in the market.
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The level of quality measurement in many (if not most) agricultural markets has
increased during the last decade.  Examples include measurements of staple length and fibre
diameter in wool markets, large increases in quality differentials in wine grapes (measurement is
largely done through repeat transactions, but near infra red spectroscopy and other technological
advances are promoting measurements at the transaction date as well), meat marbling and yield
in slaughter livestock markets (Meat Standards Australia, for example), and many more.  The
notion of agricultural goods being homogeneous commodities is being rejected as quality
differentials begin to cause large price differentials for what has historically been considered the
same product.  This can have distributional effects within the group of sellers in a market if
sellers differ in their average quality.
There are many possible reasons why quality differentials may be emerging as
economically significant factors in price determination now, after such a long period of being
largely ignored.  As income levels (exogenously) rise, the positive income elasticity of quality
demand implies consumers will become more discriminating in their food purchases.  As
national agricultural markets increase in size and national markets converge with markets of
other countries to produce global markets, opportunities for product specialization and
differentiation arise.  As computers, lasers, digital cameras, ultrasound equipment, and other
measurement and data management devices become cheaper, the costs of quality measurement
decline.
In addition to these (economic) efficiency driven reasons for the recent increases in
levels of quality measurement in agricultural markets, the concurrent increase in concentration
in many agricultural processing sectors has raised concerns that quality measurement could be a
mechanism for the exercise of monopsony market power by processors.  Many actual andPage 1
proposed increases in quality measurement have been met by opposition from producer groups
who claim the changes are designed to separate producers (multimarket price discrimination) or
suppress price (monopsony power).  Although these concerns are real and must be examined
thoroughly, a nagging problem with the opposition from producer groups is that it is often
producers themselves that initiate high quality measurement marketing alternatives.  In addition,
processors themselves (the supposed beneficiaries of this exercise of market power) are often
reluctant to become involved with the changes and they only do so after sustained producer
lobbying.
This paper examines the distributional effects of increased quality measurement using a
simple model of imperfect quality measurement.  The first section develops this model and uses
it to demonstrate why both support and opposition to increased quality measurement can come
from producers (sellers) while processors (buyers) remain indifferent to the level of quality
measurement.  The second section introduces the U.S. slaughter cattle market and calibrates the
model to this market.  The third section examines the market power debate that has evolved in
the U.S. slaughter cattle market and examines if quality differentials alone can account for
previous empirical estimates of price effects (that were attributed to market power).  Concluding
remarks on quality and future research follow.
Distributional Effects of Quality Measurement
The key assumption of this paper is that, in addition to quality heterogeneity within a
farm, there is quality heterogeneity across farms.  Some producers, whether from differential
managerial talent, land quality and weather conditions, investment decisions in genetics and
management
1, or any other reason, have higher average quality agricultural products than other
producers.  When quality is not measured or measured with a high degree of inaccuracy, the
market determines an average price over quality and high quality producers are implicitly
subsidizing low quality producers.  An increase in the level of quality measurement removesPage 2
some or all of this implicit subsidy by raising the average price high quality producers receive
and lowering the price low quality producers receive.  Overall market average price remains
constant as long as there is no endogenous increase in market average quality in response to
higher quality premiums.
To formalize this notion, Akerloff’s (1970) model of imperfect quality measurement is
used.  Hennessy (1996) develops a concise version of this model for use in agricultural markets
and his notation (with slight modification) will be adopted.  There are two qualities in the model,
since the U.S. slaughter cattle market will be used for calibration, denote the qualities choice
(good) and select (bad).  There are two types of measurement error that can occur, a choice
product can be graded select and a select product can be graded choice.  Label the probabilities
of these errors uSC |  and uCS | , respectively.  The error probabilities represent the level of quality
measurement and an increase in the level of quality measurement is represented by a decrease in
the error probabilities.
Label the fraction of total marketings that are choice for a given marketing period λ  (in
the U.S. slaughter cattle market, marketing and price discovery occur weakly).  With λ , uSC | ,
and uCS | , two additional probabilities can be defined, the probability that a product that grades
choice is actually select and the probability that a product that grades select is actually choice.

































These expressions simply state that the probability of a product that grades choice actually being
select is the fraction of select product that grades choice divided by the total fraction of product
that grades choice.  Similarly, the probability of a product that grades select actually beingPage 3
choice is the fraction of choice product that grades select divided by the total fraction of product
that grades select.
The processor (buyer) has some valuation of choice and select derived from their output
market.  Label these valuations v
C and v
S , respectively.  The value of a product that grades









CS ππ || () +− 1 .  In a competitive market the prices for choice and select will be driven to
these valuations:
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With perfect quality measurement ( 0 | | | | = = = = S C C S S C C S u u π π ), prices would simply be
processor valuations, 
C C v P =  and 
S S v P = .  Imperfect quality measurement causes an
averaging of price as the uncertainty is taken into account.  With no quality measurement at all
( 5 . 0 | | = = S C C S u u , λ π = S C| , and  λ π − = 1 |C S ), market prices converge to one average price over
quality, 
S C S C v v P P ) 1 ( λ λ − + = = .
Assume each producer in the market producers a uniform number of products (e.g. each
cattle feedlot sells one pen of 100 cattle each marketing period) and that the quality distribution
of producer  s i'  product is  i λ .  Producer  s i'  product will grade  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
~
| | i S C i C S i u u λ λ λ − + − =








λ λ − + = .  As would be
expected, prices are monotonic in quality, i.e.  j i λ λ >  implies  j i p p > .  More interesting,
though, is the distribution of prices and how this distribution changes as the level of quality
measurement changes.
The market average price, regardless of the level of quality measurement, is the average
valuation, 









i i v v v ) 1 ( λ λ − + = .  A producer with the market average quality,  λ λ = i  , will
receive the market average price which is also the true valuation of that producer’s output,
i i v p p = = .  A producer with below average quality,  λ λ < i , receives a price below the market
average but above the true valuation of their product,  p p v i i ≤ ≤  (the first weak inequality is
strict if there is imperfect quality measurement and the second weak inequality is strict is there is
at least some quality measurement, however imperfect).  A producer with above average quality,
λ λ > i , receives a price above the market average but below the true valuation of their product,
p p v i i ≥ ≥ .  In other words, the distribution of prices will have less variance than the
distribution of true valuations, caused by the averaging effect of imperfect quality measurement.
Since the model overall is zero sum, the processors pay their valuation for the market
distribution of product quality, but high quality producers receive a lower price and low quality
producers receive a higher price than the valuation of their products.
As the level of quality measurement increases, prices move away from a point mass at  p
and towards the actual distribution of  i v .  The average price received by low quality producers
declines while the average price received by high quality producers increases.  In other words,
the cross subsidy of low quality producers by high quality producers diminishes as the level of
quality measurement increases.  The total payment by processors remains constant.
This model predicts high quality producers will support (and expend resources to
achieve) while low quality producers will oppose (and expend resources to prevent) increased
levels of quality measurement.  Processors should be largely indifferent to the level of quality
measurement.  This pattern of support and opposition matches recent changes in the level of
quality measurement in the U.S. slaughter cattle very closely.Page 5
U.S. Slaughter Cattle Market
The U.S. slaughter cattle market is the market between beef cattle feedlots that feed
cattle out to slaughter weight and beef packing firms who buy the cattle and begin processing
them into meat.  In 1997, 27,328,190 head of cattle were traded with a total value of
US$20,365,894,000.  About 70% of transactions take place in what this paper will call the
traditional spot market, which emerged after the decline of terminal markets in the 1960 and
1970’s.  The cattle are marketed weekly in pens of 50 to 200 head by show lists that contain
entries for each market ready pen.  Packer procurement agents obtain the show lists and observe
the cattle, eventually placing bids on the pens they wish to purchase.  Feedlots sell to the highest
bidder.
It has long been recognized that the cattle traded are of heterogeneous quality and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) became involved in quality measurement in 1916.  The
USDA classification system focuses on the animal’s age, sex, quality grade, and yield grade.
Quality grade is an attempt to predict palatability characteristics of the meat (juiciness,
tenderness, flavour, etc.) and consists of the grades (from best to worst) prime, choice, select,
standard, commercial, utility, cutter, and canner
2.  Yield grades range from one (best) to five
(worst) and attempt to measure the pounds of meat obtained per pound of live animal (and
subsequently, leanness).
The show lists generally contain some data on the pens background and feeder
management, which provides an indication of what the pen’s quality should be.  Procurement
agents then appraise the quality distribution (quality and yield grade) of the pen by conducting a
quick visual appraisal.  The bid made will be an average of the packer’s quality valuations
weighted by the procurement agent’s visual appraisal of the quality distribution.  The visual
appraisal is very inaccurate and the result is very little price differentiation based on quality.
The industry literature often calls the spot market an average price (over quality) market.Page 6
A contrast can be made between the choice to select price spread (premium paid to
choice grade over select grade) paid to processors in their output market (the boxed-beef market)
and an imputed choice to select price spread in the slaughter cattle spot market
3,4.  Figure one
presents these spreads weekly from 1997 to 1999.  The boxed-beef spread (labelled BB 550-700
Spread) averaged $7.25/cwt while the spot market spread averaged $1.53/cwt, with a sample
correlation coefficient of 0.77 (the correlation of first differences is even lower and ranges from
0.20 to 0.28).  Although there is some differentiation based on quality, it can be seen that the
industry literature’s characterization of the spot market as an average price market is close to
accurate.  Tables 1A and 1B provides summary and descriptive statistics for these time series.
These data, along with market average quality
5, can be used to calibrate the model from
the previous section.  Since data are primarily available for the choice to select spread, it is
convenient to express the model in terms of this spread:
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This makes the suppression of the quality premium that results from imperfect quality
measurement explicit.  The shrinkage of the spread is simply proportional to the level of
imputed assignment error,  ) 1 )( ( | | S C C S
S C S C v v P P π π − − − = − .  The observed shrinkage from
$7.25/cwt to $1.53/cwt indicates a value in the range of 80% for  S C C S | | π π + .
The asymmetry of measurement error in the last two terms of the denominator assures
separate identification of the errors as long as λ ≠ 050 . .  When the quality distribution is 50/50,
the quality price spread shrinks symmetrically in the two types of measurement error and they
are not separately identifiable.  Unfortunately, the average quality from 1997 to 1999 was 54.5%
and after adjusting for the grid market selection (see below) the average was 52.8%.  SeparatePage 7
identification was not obtained and uu u SC CS == ||  was imposed to improve numerical
performance.
Using least squares criteria to fit the above equation (see Whitley, 2000, for a detailed
discussion of the calibration exercise), the estimate of u  was 40.20%.  Computing  S C| π  and
C S| π  for each market week and taking the average gave estimates for these of 42.98% and
37.55%.  This implies that, on average, from 1997 to 1999 an animal that visually appraised
choice had a 38% chance of actually being select and an animal that visually appraised select
had a 43% chance of actually being choice.  If packers value select animals at $100/cwt and
choice animals at $107/cwt, the spot market price for a choice (visually appraised) animal would
be $104.34/cwt and the spot market price for a select animal would be $103.01/cwt (with a
$1.33/cwt choice premium).  Roughly speaking, the lost $2.66/cwt on animals that grade choice
is the reason high quality producers desire higher levels of quality measurement and the
$3.01/cwt gain on animals that grade select is the reason low quality producers oppose higher
levels of quality measurement.
The last decade has seen the emergence of an alternative marketing channel in the U.S.
slaughter cattle market that involves a much higher level of quality measurement.  Ward et al.
(1996) and Ward et al. (1999) provide detailed examinations of U.S. beef cattle marketing and
changes in marketing arrangements during this time period.  The new marketing channel is
called grid pricing and has grown throughout the last decade to reach its current level of about
30% of all market transactions.  At the transaction date, a schedule of premiums and discounts
over quality traits and a base price (or formula to determine a base price) are agreed upon by
buyer and seller (the schedule of premiums and discounts constitutes the “grid”).  The animals
are shipped to the packer and slaughtered.  Prior to fabrication, the carcass is graded
6 and the
results recorded.  Price computation and payment dispersion generally occur within three to four
days of delivery at the plant.Page 8
Figure one illustrates the grid choice to select price spread along with the previously
discussed boxed-beef and spot market spreads (table 1A provides summary statistics and table
1B provides sample correlations).  Not only has the grid spread followed the boxed-beef spread
closely (their correlation coefficient is 0.98), but the mean of the grid spread is $7.40/cwt
compared with $7.25/cwt for the boxed-beef spread
7.  Although base price adjusts when moving
from the spot market to the grid market, the change from a $1.53/cwt to a $7.40/cwt choice
premium is quite large (cattle prices average $103/cwt and the feeders margin after feeder calf
and feed purchases averages $6/cwt to $7/cwt).
The emergence of grid pricing has been accompanied by fierce opposition from
producers (feedlots) claiming that it is an instrument for the exercise of monopsony power by
processors (which are highly concentrated with a national average four firm concentration ratio
of 70% to 80%).  Although market power is a serious concern in the market, the pattern of
support and opposition to grid pricing implies that more is going on.  Agricultural economists
have long been pushing value-based marketing in livestock markets (see Purcell, 1989), but
processors have been reluctant to change procurement practices.  The actual pressure to begin
grid pricing came from producers.
The first significant grid pricing arrangement was initiated by National Farms (a
producer with 274,000 head capacity) in the late 1980’s and was followed quickly by Cactus
Feeders (another producer with 480,000 head capacity).  Both of these are large producers, but
subsequent entry has included some of the smallest producers in the market.  The Decatur Feed
Alliance was an early entrant (1994) and involves the Decatur County Feedyard with a capacity
of 38,000 head.  One group of producers (U.S. Premium Beef) created a marketing cooperative
and bought a large share of the fourth largest processing firm (Farmland National Packing) in
order to establish a value based marketing scheme and capture a share of the excess return they
thought would be generated.  This group includes producers that range in size from 200 head to
100,000 head.Page 9
This pattern of support and opposition is seen in many agricultural markets that are
experiencing increases in the level of quality measurement.  The increases are largely producer
initiated and it is other groups of producers that are opposed.  Pure monopsony price suppression
is not compatible with this pattern.  Quality cross-subsidization is compatible.  Multimarket
price discrimination is also compatible.  If a more elastic group of producers knew that
differentiating themselves from the rest of the producers would result in a reduction in the
monopsony price suppression they were experiencing, then they would favor an alternative
marketing channel that would differentiate them from the other producers.  This paper will not
be able to definitively differentiate these two possibilities, but some suggestive evidence that
quality differentials alone are able to explain price differentials between the two markets is
offered in the following section.
Quality Selection and Market Power
Ward (1987) and Love and Burton (1999) offer theoretical models of how multimarket
price discrimination might be implemented by packing firms.  Applying their argument to grid
pricing would mean that the quality measurement was serving as a screening device to separate
the producers into two groups (high quality/high elasticity of supply producers and low
quality/low elasticity of supply producers).  Substantial empirical work has attempted to
measure the relationship between the level of non-spot market prices (mostly gird priced cattle)
and the spot market price and the result has consistently been a negative, but small, relationship.
Elam (1992) estimated a price equation with number of contract cattle as an explanatory variable
and found that a 1,000 head increase (nation wide) in monthly forward contract transactions is
associated with a $.003 to $.009 per cwt. decrease in the U.S. average spot price (or roughly that
a 1% increase in contract cattle was associated with a $.70 to $2 per head decrease in spot
market price).  Schroeder et al. (1993) estimated that the presence of non-spot market
transactions were associated with a $.15/cwt to $.31/cwt decline in spot market price ($1.50 toPage 10
$3.40 per head).  Ward et. al. (1996) estimate several relationships, including that a 1% increase
in captive supply deliveries results in a $.10/cwt to $.41/cwt decline in spot market price.
Hayenga and O'Brien (1992), however, only find a significant negative correlation in Kansas in
their study of Colorado, Kansas, Texas, and Nebraska.  Schroeter and Azzam (1999) confirm the
negative relationship using data from the Texas panhandle.
Of course, producers selling cattle under a grid pricing scheme faced an average choice
to select quality premium of $7.40/cwt while spot market cattle were paid a $1.53/cwt quality
premium from 1997 to 1999.  Presumably high quality producers self-select into the high quality
measurement marketing channel and the average quality in the spot market declines, lowering
the average price in the spot market.  The relevant question is thus whether or not quality alone
can explain the observed price declines in the spot market.  Multimarket price discrimination
would imply a differential larger than quality alone can explain.
There is significant anecdotal evidence that quality is not randomly distributed across
transaction types.  In 1999, of the 1092 pens National Farms sold, 882 (81.4%) graded higher
(fraction of the pen grading choice or prime) than the average of the plant they were sold to for
that market week.  Over all pens for the year, National Farms averaged 13.7% higher quality
than the plants sold to.  U.S. Premium Beef averaged 67.3% choice or prime and 61.3% Y.G. 1
& 2 marketings for 1999.  The national average for 1999 was 56.0% choice or prime and 51.2%
Y.G. 1 & 2.  These higher quality cattle receive higher prices.  In 1999, National Farms
averaged (over pens) $1.32/cwt in quality premiums.  U.S. Premium Beef averaged $14.85/head
in premiums ($1.98/cwt for a 750 pound carcass)
8.
Unfortunately, systematic (aggregate) data are not available on the quality of marketings
by marketing channel or the prices received by marketing channel.  Weekly data are available on
the overall distribution of quality and the level of grid pricing can be approximately weekly.
This section develops a simply model of quality supply to compute rough estimates of the level
of quality selection and expected price differential between marketing channels.Page 11
For a given marketing week, denote the price level of select cattle as  p , the quality
premium for choice as λ , and the price of corn as  C p .  For an individual producer, the choice
variables are the quantity of cattle to sell in a marketing week, denoted by q, and the quality of
the cattle, denoted by λ .  The producer’s profit function is given by:
) ; , ( ) ( C p q c q S p λ λ π − + = ,
where cq p C (,; ) λ  is a cost function with corn price as the primary cost shifter.  The first order
condition for the grade of quality is Sq c q pC = λ λ (,; ) .  Solving both first order conditions yields
the supply curve of quality,  ) , , (
*
C p p S h = λ .
To allow for differences in managerial ability and the self-selection of better managers
into grid priced marketing alternatives, extend the above supply function to  ) , , , (
* α λ C p p S h =
where α  is the managerial talent of the manager.  A first order Taylor series approximation to
the above function is provided by λβ αβ α β α β α * () () () () ≈+ + + 01 2 3 Spp C
9.  Suppose there are
two types of managers, α H  and α L , and that there is perfect selection of high ability managers
into the grid pricing marketing channel.  Producers face different quality premiums and price
levels in the two markets as well, but assume that these are only multiplicative shifts of each
other and that the shift parameters can be rolled into the parameter values, this is necessary
because only the grid premiums are obtainable and only the spot market price level is
obtainable.  Under these assumptions, the supply functions for a firm in the spot market and the
grid market become:
λβ α β α β α β α SL L L L
C Spp ≈+ + + 01 2 3 () () () ()
λβ α β α β α β α GH H H H
C Spp ≈+ + + 01 2 3 () () () ().
If all firms are identical in size and γ  is the fraction of total marketings that are grid priced, then
the market average quality is λγ λ γ λ λ γ λ λ =+ − = + − GS S G S () ( ) 1 .  Substituting the
approximations in and relabelling the variables yields:Page 12
λ β β β β γ α α α α ≈+ + + + + + + 01 2 3 01 2 3 Spp Spp CC () ,
where λλαα α α GS
C Spp −=+ + + 01 2 3.
Data on each of the variables above are available for nine quality traits:  prime, choice,
select, Y.G. 1 to Y. G. 5, and bull/non-bull.  See the data appendix and Whitley (2000) for a
complete discussion of the data and empirical methods used in estimation, estimations were
performed separately for each quality trait.  Table 2A presents the estimates of 
S G λ λ −  for each
of the nine quality traits (three year average of the weekly difference), three seasonal dummy
variables were included in the regression.  As can be seen, there is a statistically significant
difference for choice, Y.G. 1, and Y.G. 3.  Grid priced cattle average a 12.51% higher grading
choice (if 50% of spot market cattle graded choice, then 62.51% of grid price cattle graded
choice), similarly grid price cattle average 9.06% fewer grading Y.G. 1 and 18.55% more
grading Y.G. 3
10.
These results can be used to infer average price differences across marketing channels
(direct data is not available on this).  If  pS is the average price in the spot market and  pG  is the
average price in the grid market, then for one grade of quality the price differential is computed
by  ppS GS G S −= − () λλ .  Adding over the nine grades of quality gives the total expected price
differential.  The overall market average price is  pp p GS =+ − γγ () 1  and the difference between
the overall market average price and the average price in the spot market is given by
pp p p SG S −= − γ () .
Using all nine quality characteristics
11, the estimates in table 2A predict a price
difference between grid and spot market cattle of $3.69/cwt (standard error 0.83) and a price
difference of $0.68/cwt (standard error 0.15) between the overall market average price and the
spot market price.  The second estimate is the relevant estimate to compare with the empirical
results from past studies reported above.  This is the price increase that would occur in the spot
market if all cattle were sold in the spot market.  In other words, this is the decline that occurs inPage 13
the spot market price when high quality cattle move into the grid priced marketing channel.  The
quality price differential estimated here is actually larger than the estimates reported above.
This may arise from the fact that grid pricing has been increasing in use and composed a smaller
fraction of total market transactions during the time periods of the earlier studies.
There is an obvious endogeneity problem with the above regression, estimating supply
without controlling for demand.  Since marginal fabrication costs do not vary widely over
carcasses of varying quality, it will be assumed here that quality price differentials largely pass
through the packing plant and are sufficiently exogenous to be used without concern.  This is not
reasonable for the price level, however.  To control for this potential problem, several alternative
estimations were performed.  Table 2A presents the two price differentials for some of these
alternatives.  Estimation one is the previous estimation.  Estimation two uses pork and chicken
wholesale prices (demand shifters) and all exogenous variables as instruments for price level.
Estimation three uses the nearby live cattle futures contract price and all exogenous variables as
instruments for price level.  Estimation four drops price level form the regression.  Finally, for
comparison estimation five presents the ad hoc linear specification
λ β β γ β β β η =+ + + + + 01 2 3 4 Spp C  results with wholesale pork and chicken prices (and all
exogenous variables) used as instruments for price level.  As can be seen, the results are
robust
12.
Although low data quality and limitations on data availability prevent more rigorous
empirical examination at this point, the available data can be used to estimate the level of quality
selection and the results are suggestive that quality differentials along can account for price
divergences between marketing channels and the negative relationship between the level of non-
spot market transactions and spot market price.Page 14
Conclusion
The rise in quality measurement seen in many agricultural markets in recent years has
been met by opposition from some groups of producers and has been openly promoted by
others.  This calls into question the standard market power arguments often used by opponents
of the marketing changes.  This paper has presented a simple model of imperfect quality
measurement that is compatible with this pattern of opposition and support and, when calibrated
to the U.S. slaughter cattle market, implies price effects large enough to be driving observed
actions.  Empirical estimates demonstrate that quality is both an economically and statistically
significant factor in explaining recent changes.
The model in the first two sections of this paper has followed the literature and assumed
that quality supply is perfectly inelastic.  An exogenous, perfectly inelastic factor like
managerial talent or weather determined  i λ  and there was no endogenous response to the level
of quality premiums.  This is a serious defect of the current literature and this paper.  Quality is a
choice variable that is conceptually no different than quantity.  The transaction costs of
measuring quality are often much higher than the costs of measuring quantity in the real world.
Future theoretical research that begins to examine the producer’s choice of quality level and the
market’s choice of the level of quality measurement directly is very important.
The last few years has seen a dramatic increase in the collection and quality of data on
product quality.  Most of the data used in this paper began to be collected in 1997.  As the
quantity and quality of data improve, more rigorous and thorough empirical work will be
possible.  This is another important area for future research.Page 15
End Notes
                                                
1 Actually, the difference is presumably driven by some inelastic factor making investment decisions endogenous to
one of the first two (or some other driving factor).
2 In addition to the noise introduced by imperfect measurement of the specified traits, further noise is introduced by
the fact that these traits only serve as proxies for the true quality characteristics valued by the final consumers.
3 Since the marginal processing costs for choice and select cattle are very similar, the choice to select boxed-beef
price spread serves as a proxy for the packer’s input valuation spread.
4 No quality prices exist, per se, in the spot market since only average prices are realized for a pen of heterogenous
cattle.  The Weekly Weighted Average Slaughter Cattle Prices report does provide sufficient data to impute a choice
and a select price.  See the data appendix for a brief description of the procedure used and Whitley (2000) for a
more detail discussion.  The data and Matlab code are available from the author.  The final price spread series was
smoothed for presentation (this did not effect any results quantitatively).  The band pass filter weights for the filter
yb L x tt = ()  set at 6 weeks are b j
j j = 23 *sin( ) π
π .  These weights were approximated with the filter
yx x xx x tt t tt t =++ ++ −− + + 01039 02077 03768 02077 01039 21 12 ... .. .
5 True market average quality (λ ) is known because this data is taken from measurement that takes place in the
processing plant, not visual appraisal in the spot market.
6 The grading can be done solely by a USDA grader or by a combination of a USDA grader (measuring quality and
yield grade) and a packer employee (measuring brand specification eligibility, additional measurements, etc.).  The
market is currently experimenting with additional measurements and measurement technologies, including digital
cameras and ultrasound equipment.
7 An alternative to the imperfect quality measurement explanation for the quality price spread suppression in the
spot market is that packers have used market power to create artificial scarcity along the quality margin, thereby
deflating the quality premium.  The higher average premium in the grid market than the packers’ output market is
suggestive, however, that there is no such suppression in the grid market which, in turn, is suggestive that there is
no suppression in the spot market since a price discriminator still suppresses both markets.
8 U.S. Premium Beef data are from their publication USPB Update.  The National Farms statistics are from raw data
provided by Mr. Glenn Poe.
9 As is indicated below, there is not high variation in quality, indicating that a linear approximation should be
sufficient.  A second order approximation was also regressed and there were no significant changes in the results.
10 There is a trade off in management between quality grade and yield grade.  The higher quality grade premiums
thus skew management towards quality grade and away from yield grade.
11 Using only the statistically significant quality differentials yields slightly larger results.
12 Also examined were quadratic approximations to the supply function and different assumptions about the quality
premiums in the spot market.  Although the specification didn’t allow for complete log transformations, partial log
models were regressed as well.  All results were similar to those reported in table 2B.Page 16
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Data Appendix
The majority of the data used in this paper is from USDA market news reports and
covers the 157 weeks from 1997 to 1999.  Table 1A provides summary statistics for selected
variables.  The Estimated Composite of Boxed Beef Cut-Out Values Report constructs a daily
estimate of the value of a fabricated beef carcass by adding together the prices of the individual
cuts of meat that comprise the carcass.  Choice and select prices are computed for carcasses that
weigh 550-700 pounds and for carcasses that weigh 700-850 pounds.  These prices, less
marginal processing cost, are the packers' valuation for slaughter cattle.  Since fabrication costs
are the same for choice and select carcasses, the boxed-beef choice-select spread can be used as
a proxy for the choice-select valuation spread (see footnote three).  The National Premiums and
Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers Report collects at the beginning of the week by
phone survey the high, low, and average premium (or discount) for a variety of quality traits
offered by packing plants in grid priced procurement each week.  The report was started in 1997
and did not include an average for the first two years, for these years a simple average of the
high and low was used.
The Weakly Weighted Average Slaughter Cattle Prices Reports were used for the spot
market choice to select spread.  They provide pen prices for five geographical regions broken
down into five quality categories.  The regions are Texas/Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska,
Colorado, and Iowa/So. Minnesota.  These regions accounted for 73% of total federally
inspected U.S. slaughter from July to December, 1999.  The quality categories are pens that
visually appraise 0%-20% choice, 20%-35% choice, 35%-65% choice, 65%-80% choice, and
80%-100% choice.  Prices are further broken down by sex and pricing basis (live weight or
carcass weight), yielding four replications of the geographical and quality categories.  For a
given market week, then, if the average quality in a category is assumed to be the categories
midpoint (i.e. the average quality of the 65%-80% range is 72.5% choice) there are 100 potentialPage 19
equations to solve for the two quality prices (regions do not report transactions in all categories
and most weeks averaged about 40 price/quality pairs).  Using least squares criteria and
weighting by the number of head traded in each category, estimates were made for the choice
and select prices for each week.  A 62.5% dressing percent (to calibrate carcass and live weight
pricing) and level shift dummies for region and sex were used.  Nine weeks (primarily
Christmas and other holiday weeks) had too few observations to estimate and linear
interpolation was used to estimate their values.
The National Steer and Heifer Estimated Grading Percent Report provides weekly
overall quality breakdowns by geographic regions.  The spot market price data includes CO, IA,
KS, NE, OK, TX, and Southern MN.  The quality report includes these states (except Southern
MN) and AR, LA, MO, NM, MT, ND, SD, UT, and WY.  From June to December 1999, these
additional states accounted for less than 4% of total federally inspected slaughter for the whole
region.  This mismatch is ignored.  The quality report provides overall market average quality,
the relevant quality for the estimation of Hennessy's model is spot market average quality.  This
was estimated by correcting for the quality selection found in the third section of the main text.
The estimation of the level of quality selection uses the above variables, corn prices, and
the fraction of grid marketings.  Corn prices for the regions were collected from individual
USDA market news offices and state Departments of Agriculture.  The most difficult to obtain
variable is the level of captive versus spot marketings.  The Breakdown of Reported Feedlot
Volume Report provides the best weekly estimate available of captive supply marketings.  The
report provides data for four regions, TX/OK, KS, CO, and NE/WY.  For these regions, the
report lists cash sales and additional movement, which includes:  a) cattle that are fed by or for
packers; b) contract or formula agreements; c) cattle financed by packers and slaughtered by the
same packer; and d) cattle committed to packers with the price non-negotiated prior to change in
ownership.  The fraction of grid marketings is computed by dividing the additional movement inPage 20
a week by the total slaughter (from the National Steer and Heifer Estimated Grading Percent


















































































































































Table 1A:  Summary Statistics and Correlations of Constructed Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Grid Ch-Se Spread $7.40/cwt 7.25 3.18 2.21 14.58
BB Ch-Se 550-700 $7.25/cwt 6.70 3.67 0.81 15.78
BB Ch-Se 700-850 $7.16/cwt 7.02 3.69 0.23 16.45
Spot Ch-Se Spread $1.53/cwt 1.43 0.80 -0.13 4.38
Smoothed Spot Spread $1.53/cwt 1.43 0.65 0.24 3.63
Fraction Choice+ 54.63% 53.99 3.15 48.64 62.68
Fraction Y.G. 1&2 54.28% 54.42 2.29 49.48 59.79
Cattle Price Level $103.00/cwt 103.49 4.99 90.99 112.67
Corn Price $2.25/bu. 2.32 0.36 1.67 2.88
Grid Pricing 18.18% 18.32 4.28 8.37 29.95





Boxed-Beef, 550-700 0.635 0.773
Boxed-Beef, 700-850 0.652 0.788
Grid 0.619 0.746Page 23
Table 2A:  Quality Selection Across Marketing Channels (Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Quality Trait



















Market Ave. Quality 0.0216 0.5247 0.3607 0.1094 0.4334 0.3355 0.0119 0.0009 0.0114
Ave. Quality Premium $6.0732/cwt 7.3962 10.0027 0.6791 1.3116 14.9276 4.9745 -4.9745 -28.1029
Table 2B:  Sensitivity to Specification
a
Estimation
Estimate 1 2 3
b 45
Grid Price Less Spot Price 3.69 3.74 3.65 3.77 3.70
Overall Market Price Less Spot Price 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.68
a All values $/cwt.
b Estimated from March, 1997, to December, 1999.